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S O C I A L  S C I E N C E S
Individual solutions to shared problems create a 
modern tragedy of the commons
Jörg Gross1* and Carsten K.W. De Dreu1,2
Alone and together, climatic changes, population growth, and economic scarcity create shared problems that 
can be tackled effectively through cooperation and coordination. Perhaps because cooperation is fragile and 
easily breaks down, societies also provide individual solutions to shared problems, such as privatized health-
care or retirement planning. But how does the availability of individual solutions affect free-riding and the 
efficient creation of public goods? We confronted groups of individuals with a shared problem that could be 
solved either individually or collectively. Across different cost-benefit ratios of individually versus collectively 
solving the shared problem, individuals display a remarkable tendency toward group-independent, individual 
solutions. This “individualism” leads to inefficient resource allocations and coordination failure. Introducing 
peer punishment further results in wasteful punishment feuds between “individualists” and “collectivists.” In 
the presence of individual solutions to shared problems, groups struggle to balance self-reliance and collec-
tive efficiency, leading to a “modern tragedy of the commons.”
INTRODUCTION
Throughout history, humans have provided for individual needs by 
establishing public goods such as armies and law enforcement, pub-
lic education and social security, and public transportation. Likewise, 
humans can collectively fight the threats of climate change and the 
decline of scarce resources such as fossil fuel and fresh water (1–5). 
Yet, creating and sustaining public goods and shared solutions is chal-
lenging: They require cooperation that can quickly deteriorate in the 
absence of social preferences (6, 7), reciprocity (3, 4, 8), and norm 
enforcement (9–13).
Perhaps because cooperation is inherently fragile, societies often 
provide individual solutions to shared problems. Privatized security 
(e.g., gun ownership) competes with a publicly funded police force, 
private education competes with public schooling, and transporta-
tion by car is an individual solution to the shared need for mobility. 
Theoretically, the availability of individual solutions alters the cost- 
benefit ratio of cooperation and the need for reciprocity, two core 
mechanisms underlying human cooperation and public goods pro-
vision (3, 4, 8). Yet, standard theory on public goods provision does 
not capture whether and how individual solutions influence collec-
tive action problems. As a result, we poorly understand how individ-
ual solutions to shared problems influence the human inclination for 
cooperation and coordination.
Creating individual solutions for shared problems decreases the 
individuals’ immediate codependence on groups (14–19) and al-
lows individuals to avoid the possibility that their cooperation is 
exploited by group members who do not contribute enough (“free 
riders”) (15, 20, 21). To illustrate this situation, imagine a small vil-
lage facing a flood that threatens the welfare of all group members. 
Villagers can join forces and build a dam that protects the village, 
including those villagers who did not contribute personal resources. 
Hence, the collective solution shares the property of a public goods 
dilemma; it is exploitable by free riding. However, imagine that each 
villager can also use his or her personal resources to build a dam 
around his or her own home, which saves the home owner but not 
the fellow villagers. Although this individual solution may be costlier 
than collectively solving the problem, it protects the individual against 
exploitation and the risk that the collective solution fails.
In two experiments, we confronted participants with this novel 
collective action problem in groups of four (Fig. 1). We show that, 
when individual solutions to shared problems are available, humans 
display a strong tendency toward self-reliance that creates, in turn, 
a “modern tragedy of the commons”—the inefficient allocation of 
resources by solving shared problems individually. Furthermore, 
we show that norm enforcement through peer punishment, which 
can sustain cooperation in classic public goods provision problems 
(9–13), exacerbates rather than mitigates this modern tragedy of the 
commons.
In our experiments, each group member was endowed with 10 
resource points (RPs) for 10 rounds (100 RPs, in total). In each 
round, group members had to allocate their RPs to their individual 
pool, a shared public pool, or keep any amount for themselves 
(Fig. 1A). The RPs invested in the individual pool and shared public 
pool accumulated over rounds. After the 10th and final investment 
round, a participant would keep any resources not invested if the 
participant allocated enough resources to her individual pool 
to reach a predefined individual target. She would also keep her 
remaining resources if the group collectively allocated enough 
resources to the public pool to reach a predefined public target 
(Fig. 1B). If group members did not reach either their private or the 
public target in time, they lost everything. After each round, each 
group member observed the allocation decisions of the other group 
members and was informed about the so far accumulated RPs in 
their own individual pool and the shared public pool. Hence, partic-
ipants were confronted with a dynamic collective action problem in 
which they had 10 rounds to invest enough resources into two con-
flicting solution strategies to prevent losing their remaining RPs.
Across five blocks of decision-making, we manipulated the cost- 
benefit ratio of the collective versus individual solution by changing 
the relative costs of the individual and public targets. The cost of the 
collective solution (cc) was fixed to 160 RPs. Hence, if each group 
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member would invest 40% of their points to the public pool, then the 
group would be saved. The cost of the individual solution (ci) was 
either 80, 70, 60, 50, or 40, leading to varying cost-benefit ratios of 
individualism i = ci/(cc/n) = {2.0, 1.75, 1.5, 1.25, 1.0}.
If the cost-benefit ratio is high, then participants are relatively de-
pendent on group efforts and collective action, similar to socie ties that 
heavily depend on direct reciprocity (such as hunter-gatherer groups). 
Under the highest codependence level (ci = 80; cc = 160; i = 2), efficiently 
coordinating on the public solution would save two times as much re-
sources compared to individually solving the problem. With a 
decrease in i, participants become relatively more independent from 
their group by gaining access to affordable individual solutions to 
shared problems, similar to modern socie ties. Note that, under ci = 40 
(i = 1), there is no efficiency gain from coordinating on the public solu-
tion for the group, since the individual solution is as affordable as the 
public solution (assuming that group members contribute equally).
RESULTS
Transitioning from group dependence to independence, individu-
als switched from collectivism to self-reliance (random-effects regression, 
P < 0.001; Fig. 2A). Under high codependence (i = 2), 80% of the 
group members collectively solved the problem, without the need of 
any formal institutions or norm enforcement. Under low codepen-
dence (i = 1), on the other hand, 99% of the group members solved 
the problem individually.
Across codependence levels, groups frequently failed to coordi-
nate on the more efficient collective solution. Instead, participants 
opted for individual problem solving and were willing to pay a high 
premium for self-reliance (Fig. 2B). On average, groups switched 
from the individual to the collective solution when i > 1.7. In other 
words, only when efficient coordination would save more than 70% 
of the resources groups started to collectively solve the problem. 
Wasted resources and decline in group welfare followed an inverted 
U-shape relation across codependence levels (random-effects re-
gression, P < 0.01; Fig. 2C). Hence, especially in situations of inter-
mediary codependence, a new type of the tragedy of the commons 
emerges: When group members are relatively independent but 
would still benefit from collective action, a conflict between individ-
ualistic and collective strategies led to inefficient solutions to shared 
problems.
Coordinating on the public solution is far from trivial. Because 
of the large strategy space, there are many theoretical Nash equilibria 
in which rational agents find a collective solution (see the Supple-
mentary Materials for details). Choosing individual solutions to 
shared problems may, hence, be driven by the risk of coordination 
failure that is inherently part of the collective solution in our setting 
(working in groups is risky and success is uncertain, while working 
alone is safe). Furthermore, while free riding on public contribu-
tions can lead to the highest potential payoff, it can also result in 
losing all remaining RPs if other group members are not compen-
sating the missing resources to reach a public solution. Consequently, 
we observe rather low levels of free riding across the independence 
levels (Fig. 3A). Choosing the individual solution could also be driven 
by the fear of exploitation and free riding. Under the highest code-
pendence (i = 2), 40% of the participants contributed more than the 
fair share to the public pool (“altruists”), while 26% contributed less 
than their fair share to the public pool and did not attempt to reach 
their individual threshold either (“free riders”). In the transition to 
group independence, the collective action problem transformed from 
a public goods dilemma, in which some group members are forced 
to offset the costs of free riding, to a purely individual problem-solving 
task (Fig. 3A).
Individuals who contributed less than their fair share to the pub-
lic solution under high interdependence were not systematically 
more or less likely to switch to an individualistic strategy compared 
to individuals who contributed their fair share or more when the 
cost-benefit ratio of individualism decreased (Markov chain transition 
estimates, P = 0.43; Fig. 3B). In other words, knowing the behavior 
of an individual under high codependence did not allow us to 
predict when the individual would switch to an individualistic 
strategy under decreasing codependence. This suggests that indi-
vidualism cannot simply be equated to selfishness, as suggested 
previously (6, 7), but rather emerges as a distinct strategy when 
the need for reciprocity declines. Furthermore, an independent 
measure of participants’ social preferences that was obtained after 
the experiment (estimating the degree of nonstrategic prosociality 
of individuals through a series of allocation decision) was cor-
related with public and withheld contributions but not with in-
vestments to the individual pool. The more the participant was 
Keep resources
Resources
Collective pool
Individual pool
A
Individual solution Collective solution
B C
Fig. 1. (In)dependence dilemma. Group members face a shared problem that 
they have to solve in a given time. (A) They can either individually or collectively 
solve the problem by investing resources into an individual pool or a collective and 
shared pool, respectively. (B) Individually solving the problem costs ci and saves the 
individual from losing all of his or her remaining resources. Collectively solving the 
problem saves all group members for a cost of cc, where cc >> ci. (C) The collective 
solution is exploitable by free riding. Furthermore, the coexistence of collective 
and individual strategies can lead to coordination failure and wasted resources.
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willing to sacrifice her own resources to help another unknown 
person in this measure (degree of prosociality), the more RPs the 
participant contributed to the public solution (r = 0.17, P = 0.03) 
and the less the participant kept for herself (r = −0.18, P = 0.02). 
Yet, the degree of prosociality was uncorrelated with investments 
in the individual pool (r = 0.00, P = 0.99). Knowing the participant’s 
other-regarding concerns did not allow us to predict her likelihood 
to opt for the individual solution.
Even when the collective solution could save two times as much 
resources, 15% of participants still followed an individualistic strategy, 
and across all dependence levels, groups could have saved 45 RPs 
on average if they would have coordinated on the public solution. In 
classic public goods dilemmas, peer punishment has been shown to 
foster group contributions by enforcing norms of cooperation (9–13). 
In a second experiment, we therefore investigated whether peer 
punishment could also help to solve coordination conflicts be-
tween individualism and collectivism. Groups engaged in the same 
(in)dependence dilemma but, after each round, could assign up to 
five punishment points (PPs) to each other group member. Each 
assigned PP reduced final earnings of the punisher by one unit but 
reduced the final earnings of the punished by three units.
Across codependence levels, peer punishment indeed increased 
the propensity to collectively rather than individually solve the 
problem (random-effects logistic regression, P = 0.04; Fig. 4A). 
However, punishment did not reduce free riding (random-effects 
logistic regression, P = 0.72; Fig. 4B). Instead, punishment was 
mainly aimed at “individualists” (random-effects regression, P < 0.001) 
who, in turn, punished altruists (random-effects regression, P = 0.01). 
Note that free riders, while contributing less than the fair share and 
less than cooperators and altruists to the collective solution, still 
contributed more to the public solution than individualists who fo-
cussed on their individual target instead. In this regard, it makes 
sense that altruists focus their punishment mainly on individualists 
who, from their perspective, follow an incompatible strategy to the 
shared problem. However, this punishment pattern, resulting 
from the conflict between self-reliance and collective efficiency, led 
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Fig. 2. From collective action to individualism. (A) When transitioning from high (i = 2) to low codependence (i = 1), groups increasingly switch from collectively (blue) 
to individually (yellow) solving the problem. (B) Many participants are willing to pay for individually solving the problem, even when it exceeds the costs of an efficient 
collective solution by 25 to 100%. (C) The coexistence of individual and public solutions leads to an inverted U-shaped waste of resources across dependence levels. In 
particular, in intermediary dependence situations, groups overinvest resources compared to the efficient group coordination benchmark of 160 RPs.
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to an overall decrease in group welfare (random-effects regression, 
P = 0.014). Together, these results question the effectiveness of un-
regulated peer punishment in modern tragedies of the commons, 
in which individual solutions to collective problems are available.
DISCUSSION
For most of human history, cooperation has been a necessity. Hunter- 
gatherer societies facing harsh environments from the Inuit at the 
Polar Circle to the Mbendjele in the Congo are highly codependent and 
show a remarkable degree of cooperation and egalitarianism (17, 22–25). 
This mimics our finding that, when individual solutions are too 
costly to pursue, groups endogenously manage to coordinate and solve 
the problem as a collective without much need for formal institutions.
The marked changes that came about with technical innovation 
and market economies (26, 27) made reciprocal cooperation a pos-
sibility rather than a necessity. Studies have shown that individualism 
and valuing independence are worldwide on the rise and correlated 
with economic changes (28–30). We show that, in collective action 
problems, reduced codependence on others can lead to inefficient 
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Fig. 3. Strategy shifts. (A) Under high codependence (i = 2), some group members are willing to pay more than their fair share to the public solution (altruistic strategy, 
green) to offset the cost of free riders who contribute less than their fair share and, at the same time, do not attempt to solve the problem individually (free riding strate-
gy, red). Others either contribute their fair share (cooperating strategy, blue) or avoid the free rider problem by opting for individually solving the problem (individualistic 
strategy, yellow). With decreased codependence, the share of participants who individually solve the problem increases. (B) People who followed a cooperative/altruistic 
strategy are as likely to switch to individualism, as people who followed a free riding strategy. Numbers indicate the average transition probability based on Markov 
chain estimations when individualism becomes more affordable.
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allocation of resources and coordination failures due to (some) group 
members opting for independency rather than group cooperation.
Traditional measures such as peer punishments, which can at-
tenuate the classic tragedy of the commons (9–13), appear to amplify 
rather than mitigate this coordination failure. Providing an unreg-
ulated peer punishment option as a mean to enforce cooperation 
norms rather led to punishment feuds between individualists and 
collectivists. Outside of the laboratory, societies that provide attain-
able individual solutions to shared needs may therefore have 
found other solutions to foster cooperation and coordination, such 
as centralized punishment institutions or establishment of stronger 
norms of cooperation and generalized reciprocity (31, 32).
Choosing individual solutions over collective action might be driven 
by a fear of exploitation and pessimistic beliefs about the cooperative-
ness of others or by the risk that the collective solution is not reached. 
Arguably, conditional cooperators (with pessimistic beliefs in the coop-
erativeness of others) should favor individualistic solutions when they 
are affordable. Another interpretation is that people differ in their 
desire for being independent of social groups, regardless of their 
other-regarding concerns. The dynamic nature of our experimental 
design and the fact that the individual solution was safe while the col-
lective solution required coordination and was risky do not allow us to 
cleanly disentangle individual motives. Yet, the results on strategy 
shifts across the interdependence levels and the results of individual’s 
social preferences point to the possibility that a preference for self- 
reliance may be distinct from preferences for selfishness versus cooper-
ativeness, opening up interesting avenues for future studies.
Contemporary societies face pressing shared problems such as 
underfunded public education and law enforcement and resource 
scarcity due to climate change and population growth. Here, we 
documented that a modern tragedy of the commons emerges 
when and because individual solutions to these shared problems 
are introduced. Whereas individual solutions allow individuals 
to inoculate themselves against exploitation, they can lead to a 
costly failure to coordinate collective action for the benefit of all 
and a wasteful punishment feud between those that favor self-reliance 
and those that favor collective efficiency. Whenever individual 
solutions to collective problems exist or are introduced, groups 
and societies need not only to contain the free rider problem but 
also to strike a balance between the ability of its members to ab-
stain from collective action on the one hand and efficient public 
goods provision on the other.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
We tested a total of 160 participants in a computerized experiment at the 
University of Leiden. We obtained informed consent from all participants 
before taking part in the experiment. Participants were free to withdraw 
from participation at any time. Experiments were approved by the Psy-
chology Research Ethics Board of the University of Leiden (file CEP17-
1008/332). Participants were randomly allocated to groups of four 
(40 groups in total) and to the two experiments. After instructions and 
comprehension questions (see the Supplementary Materials), groups 
were confronted with the (in)dependence dilemma. Each group member 
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Fig. 4. Peer punishment enforces collective action. (A) Across codependence levels, peer punishment (solid bars) increases the propensity to solve the problem together, 
compared to baseline (open bars). (B) Peer punishment changes the average composition of strategies (open bars, baseline; solid bars, punishment). Cooperative strate-
gies (blue) increase, while individualism (yellow) decreases. The frequency of free riding (red) and altruism (green) is, however, unaffected by peer punishment. (C) Peer 
punishment is mainly dealt by altruists (green) punishing individualists (yellow). Individualists are willing to sacrifice resources to punish altruists in turn. Free riders (red) 
and cooperators (blue) are mainly left alone and refrain from punishing others. Numbers indicate the average assigned PPs in one block.
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received 10 RPs worth €0.80 in each round and could freely distribute 
these RPs among their individual pool and a shared public pool, keeping 
the remaining RPs for themselves. Across rounds, the RPs invested 
to their individual pool or the shared public pool accumulated. After the 
final round, participants knew that they had to reach either the public or 
their individual target to avoid losing all RPs that they kept for them-
selves. To reach the public target, the group’s public pool had to contain 
at least cc RPs after the 10th and final round. The cost for collectively 
solving the problem was fixed to cc = 160 RPs (i.e., 40% of each group 
member’s endowment). To reach the individual target, the group mem-
ber’s individual pool had to contain at least ci RPs after the 10th and final 
round. The cost for individually solving the problem varied across five 
blocks with ci = 40, 50, 60, 70, and 80. The block order was counterba-
lanced across groups. After each round, participants saw the so far accu-
mulated RPs in the public pool, their individual pool, and how other 
group members allocated their resources in the last round. The second 
experiment proceeded identically, except that each investment stage 
was followed by a peer punishment stage. In this stage, participants were 
able to assign up to five PPs to each other group member. Each assigned 
PP would reduce the final earnings of the punisher by one RP and the 
final earnings of the punished by three RPs. After each punishment 
stage, participants received feedback on how many PPs each group 
member received in total. One block of the experiment was randomly 
selected for payment, and participants received any remaining RPs in 
euro (on top of a fixed lump sum payment of €6.50 and earnings from 
the slider measure) if they reached either their individual or the public 
target in the selected block. After the experiment, participants answered 
demographic questions (such as age, gender, and field of study) and 
filled out the incentivized six-item social value orientation slider mea-
sure (6). In this task, participants have to make six decisions on how to 
allocate points between themselves and an unknown other person. 
Points can be allocated self-servingly or prosocially (sacrificing points 
to benefit the other person), allowing us to estimate the degree of other- 
regarding concerns (i.e., social preferences).
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